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Appendix A: Design and details of dynamic-treatment replication  
 
Participants. Thirty-eight subjects were recruited from UCLA (19 females; mean age ± SD = 
20.9 ± 4.1 years) and 25 subjects were recruited from Caltech (4 females; mean age ± SD = 21.3 
± 2.2 years).
13
 Before the experiment, subjects gave informed consent to participate according to 
a protocol approved by Institutional Review Boards of UCLA, and the California Institute of 
Technology, Pasadena CA. Subjects were paid their earnings from the experiment, with the 
conversion rate of 200 Experimental Dollars equal to 1 US $, in addition to a $5 show-up fee. 
 
In the following subsections, we examine the trials where selling decisions were observed. 
Hence, Delay herein means left-censored or uncensored Delay. When the trials with right-
censored Delay were included, the qualitative aspects of the data did not change (see 
Supplementary Table 2, Supplementary Figures 2 and 5). Note that right-censored Delay is likely 
to underestimate actual Delay, and the left-censored Delay could overestimate the actual Delay 
which could have been negative, potentially biasing the results.
14
 Therefore, we repeat all the 
analyses using static trials only, with a redefinition of Delay as the length of periods between the 
submitted selling time and the signal arrival time; Delayuncensored denotes this new definition of 
Delay. Using Delayuncensored yields results qualitatively identical to those obtained using the 
Delay measure (See Section C in the Supplementary Materials). 
In theory, all sellers are ex ante identical in a sense that in equilibrium they all employ the 
same unique symmetric strategy. Hence in analyzing data, we do not distinguish the behavior of 
1st, 2nd, and 3rd sellers (following BM, who do the same). Also, it should be noted that we 
discarded dynamic trials in which subjects exited too early (in the first 5 periods) since some 
UCLA subjects reported, during debriefing, that they accidently pressed the enter key at the start 
of a trial. A total of 22 such dynamic trials were hence discarded.
15
 Reported p-values are two-
sided unless noted otherwise. 
                                                     
13
 Seven additional subjects participated in the experiment, but were excluded because of very rapid response times 
(RTs < 2 secs) or selling times highly correlated with the random cursor starting points in static trials. These subjects 
do not behave according to optimal theory, but also do not give us much insight about alternative theories, and 
further, they create poor within-subject control to measure anxiety in the dynamic games.  
14
 BM is aware of this censoring problem. To get around the problem, they estimated the delay measure using the 
Tobit procedure, assuming that the right-censored delay is normally distributed with mean τ. However, this 
specification is likely to yield an estimate in favor of τ. 
15
 BM also eliminated observations where subjects sold in the first 10 periods. 
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Descriptive Statistics. First, we describe some very basic properties of the data. Due to sampling 
variation, the distribution of signal arrivals happened to be slightly different between the 
dynamic and static trials for UCLA subjects. As a result, the durations of trials are also slightly 
different (see Supplementary Figure 1). Later analyses control for these differences.  
The success rates between dynamic (M = 0.57; SD = 0.13) and static trials (M = 0.57; SD = 
0.14) were not significantly different in the two conditions or between subject pools (Paired 
sample t-test, t(62) = −0.17, p > 0.5; signed rank test, z-value = −0.003, p > 0.5). However, it is 
noticeable that the success rates are substantially above 50%, which is the fraction expected if 
subjects are playing the equilibrium delay strategy—it is the first indication that subjects are 
generally selling earlier than the theory predicts. The success rates for dynamic and static trials 
are also highly correlated within subjects (ρ = 0.59, p < 4.24 × 10−7), which indicates stable 
individual differences in waiting. 
The next analyses look at the distribution of delays after signal arrival, before selling. There 
are four basic results. Delays are: Shorter than predicted; longer in the static condition; depend 
on signal arrival time; and grow longer with experimental experience.  
 
Delays are shorter than predicted. Figure 3 shows the average of Delay in the two conditions, 
and within each subject pool. The group averages are significantly smaller than the theory 
prediction of τ* = 21 (Dynamic: t(62) = −18.86, p < 2.30×10−27; Static: t(62) = −10.37, p < 
3.55×10
−15
, one-sample t-tests; Also see Supplementary Figure 2). The short average delays are 
substantially influenced by the left-censored observations (i.e., early pre-signal selling) which are 
set to zero. In static trials where all selling decisions are observed, the mean Delayuncensored is 
19.23 (Median = 16.76; SD = 10.35), which is insignificantly different than τ* = 21 in a 
parametric test (one sample t-test, t(62) = −1.36, one sided p = 0.18), but is significantly different 
using a non-parametric test (one-sample signed-rank test, z-value = −2.27; p = 0.02).     
 
Static delays are longer than dynamic delays. Figure 3 compares delays in the static and dynamic 
conditions. Mean Delay was greater in static trials than in dynamic trials (paired sample t-test, 
t(62) = −5.32; p < 1.52×10−6; signed rank test, z-value = −4.40; p < 0.0001). A two-way 
ANOVA indicated a significant difference between dynamic and static delay (the static delays 
are longer) for both groups and significantly shorter delays for the UCLA group (due to the 
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difference in dynamic trials only).
16
 Supplementary Figure 3a shows distributions of individual 
average Delay. 
 
Delays depend on signal arrival time. In both the dynamic and static clock games, delays in 
selling after receiving a signal should be constant, due to the memoryless property of the 
exponential distribution underlying t0. However, this property is quite counterintuitive; it means 
that conditional on not having received a signal, agents should behave in exactly the same way 
independently of the period they are in. 
This predicted independence of delay from signal arrival is not evident in the data. Delay 
decreased as a function of the signal arrival time in both dynamic and static trials 
(Supplementary Figure 4a). Further, in each of six signal arrival time bins,
17
  mean Delay in 
static trials was longer than in dynamic trials (Figure 4). This pattern was preserved when the 
trials with right-censored Delay were included (Supplementary Figure 3 and Supplementary 
Table 2). Delayuncensored also decreased as a function of the signal arrival period (Supplementary 
Figure 9). Tobit regression analysis of Delay supports the graphical conclusion (Table 1). Signal 
arrival time strongly affects Delay across various model specifications. Both of the UCLA and 
the Caltech groups waited longer to sell in static trials than in dynamic trials. With some other 
minor differences in these graphs, Delay in static trials was longer in the Caltech group. 
Delayuncensored also showed a similar pattern (Supplementary Figure 10 and Supplementary Table 
3). 
Delays grow longer with experimental experience. Next we report whether subjects’ selling 
strategy was adaptive over time (see below for more detail). Comparing the first 50 and last 50 
trials, Delays are longer in the last 50 trials and the dynamic vs. static difference in Delay is 
smaller in the last 50 trials (Figure 4). Regression analyses of Delayuncensored confirm these 
significant learning effects in both groups (Supplementary Table 4). 
 A comparison with the BM data 
                                                     
16
 Significant main effects were observed for Condition (F(1, 61) = 23.88, p < 0.001) and for Group (F(1, 61) = 6.64, 
p = 0.0124), and their interaction was marginally significant (F(1, 61) = 3.72, p = 0.0585) according to a two-way 
analysis of variance with one within-subject factor, Condition, and one between-subject factor, Group.   
17
 The signal arrival periods were binned into 6 bins, by 25 periods starting from 0, except for the last bin (rare 
signal periods over 125 periods were binned all together). 
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In this section, we briefly report some new analyses of the subset of BM’s data (which 
included other interesting treatments) to compare them with our data. The unobservable 
treatment in their paper has an identical formal structure to the dynamic trials in our experiment, 
except that parameter values and some procedures are different. As a result, the (risk-neutral) 
equilibrium strategic delay τ* is 23 periods in their experiment, a little longer than the 
equilibrium τ* = 21 in our design. 
Like BM, we discard the few observations in which selling (or exit) occurs within the first 10 
periods after the start of the trial. All the definitions of the variables remain the same except for 
Experience.
18
 Herein only trials with uncensored and left-censored Delays (trials with successful 
selling) were analyzed. 
In BM’s data, mean Delay was shorter than the prediction, τ* = 23, in all sessions 
(Supplementary Figure 6). Most of the subjects exhibited mean Delay that is significantly shorter 
than 23 periods (one sample t-test, t(71) = −18.81; p < 2.74 × 10−29; signed rank test, z-value = 
−7.33; p < 2.23 × 10−13). 
Delay was also negatively correlated with the signal arrival time (4c; Table 1). Note that the 
coefficient for the signal arrival time in the Tobit delay models (−0.209 in Table 1) is very close 
to those in our data (−0.196 ~ –0.205; see Table 1). 
We examined the effect of learning on Delay, which BM left to future work. Regardless of 
experience, the signal arrival time remained as a significant predictor of Delay (Figure 4c; Table 
2). However, Delay increased in the last 25 trials compared to the first 20 trials as observed in 
our data (see Delay in the dynamic trials in Figure 5a). 
In summary, despite some differences in design and procedures BM’s pioneering findings are 
quite closely replicated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18
 There were only 45 trials in BM’s original experiment. Hence, we defined Experience as 0 if a given trial was in 
the first 20 trials, and as 1 if it was in the last 25 trials.  
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Notes. Red horizontal lines indicate the theory-predicted delay, τ* = 21. Error bars indicate standard errors. (a) Delay 
by Condition. (b) Delay by Group and Condition. 
 
Figure 3  Difference in Average Delay between Dynamic and Static Trials: Experiment I 
 
   
Notes: (a) Dynamic trials in Experiment I. (b) Static trials in Experiment I. (c) The data from the BM experiment. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (paired sample t-test, one sided). 
Figure 4  Delay as a Function of the Signal Arrival Period, Moderated by Experience 
 
 
Variable  A B C D BM 
Constant  22.720†  22.367†  22.318†  22.047†  36.667†  
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(0.678) (0.903) (0.721) (0.955) (0.794) 
Signal  
−0.196†  −0.205†  −0.205†  −0.204†  −0.209†  
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Static 
2.780†  3.955† 4.541† 4.538† 
 
(0.317) (0.645) (0.704) (0.901) 
 
Signal*Static  
−0.019* −0.020* −0.019 
 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
 
Caltech  
−0.026 
 
0.646 
 
 
(1.299) 
 
(1.455) 
 
Caltech*Signal  
0.039† 0.041† 0.039** 
 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) 
 
Caltech*Static   
−1.283* −1.293 
 
  
(0.621) (1.290) 
 
Caltech*Signal*Static 
   
−0.001 
 
      (0.018)   
Log likelihood  −11411.10 −11397.68 −11395.55 −11395.42 −4399.32 
Wald χ2 test statistics 1998.57† 2018.18† 2023.58† 2024.40† 847.16† 
Left-censored at Delay = 0  
  
581 452 
Uncensored  
   
3012 1055 
Right-censored  
   
0 0 
Included Observations        3593 1507 
Notes. Delay is censored at 0 (subject random-effects incorporated). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.001. 
Table 1  Results of Random-Effects Tobit Regression Analyses of Delay: Experiment I 
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Variable  A B C D BM-1 BM-2 
Constant  
21.779†  21.314†  21.377†  21.311†  34.973†  34.342†  
-0.756 (0.772) (0.766) (0.772) (0.872) (1.118) 
Signal  
−0.209†  −0.209†  −0.209†  −0.209†  −0.211†  −0.202†  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
Experience 
1.952** 2.878†  1.973** 2.305** 2.907† 4.143*  
(0.640) (0.714) (0.639) (0.811) (0.697) (1.432) 
Signal*Experience 
0.026** 0.025** 0.037†  0.034** 
 
−0.014  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
 
(0.014) 
Static 
2.702†  3.645†  3.509†  3.645†  
  
(0.313) (0.451) (0.402) (0.451) 
  
Static*Experience  
−1.812** 
 
−0.662 
  
 
(0.625) 
 
(0.993) 
  
Static*Signal*Experience 
  
−0.024** -0.018 
  
    (0.008) (0.012)     
Log likelihood  −11342.52 −11338.32 −11337.43 −11337.20 −4388.37 −4388.93 
Wald χ2 test statistics 2151.16† 2160.83† 2159.90† 2161.21† 867.93† 870.51† 
Left-censored at Delay = 0  
   
581 
 
452 
Uncensored  
   
3012 
 
1055 
Right-censored  
   
0 
 
1507 
Included Observations        3593   3593 
Notes. Delay is censored at 0 (subject random-effects incorporated). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Static*Signal not significant in any of the specifications above. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.001. 
Table 2: Results of Random-Effects Tobit Regression Analyses of Delay on the Signal Arrival Time and 
Experience: Experiment I (A~D) and BM (BM-1 and BM-2) 
 
